1. Overture

This chapter summarises the themes of the book, with an emphasis on how they connect to some infrequently discussed events in the history of philosophy. In particular, it discusses how the idea that what knows varies depending on what one is inquiring into interacts with these four events. First, the idea from late Ancient sceptics such as Philo of Larissa that scepticism needs to be paired with a notion of when something can sensibly taken for granted in everyday life. Second, the medieval discussions of when a jurist will be forgiven in the afterlife if they have sentenced an innocent person. Third, the early modern discussions of what standards should be applied to publishing in the new invention: the scientific journal. And fourth, the classical Nyāya arguments that respond to the sceptic by highlighting the practical role of knowledge. The aim here is to suggest an alternative way of looking at the history of epistemology, one that makes the practicality of knowledge central to the story.